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INTRODUCTION
A legal standard for partisan gerrymandering is the holy grail of
election law.1 For decades, jurists and commentators have struggled
to articulate a manageable standard that will avoid entangling
courts in the political thicket. The pressure for courts to put some
limits on partisan gerrymandering has intensified over the past
decade as mapmakers have drawn lines with increasingly deadly
precision, maximizing their own party’s power while minimizing
that of the other major party.2 The enhanced technological tools at
their disposal can allow the dominant party to retain its dominance
throughout the decade, even in strong years for the other major
party.3 This effectively allows the party that holds the pen at the
start of the decade to retain power for the next ten years, even when
more voters would prefer a different outcome.
Still, a fierce debate rages over whether partisan gerrymander-
ing claims are nonjusticiable political questions, as four Justices in
Vieth v. Jubelirer believed.4 There can be no denying the difficulty
or gravity of the problem. On one level, partisan gerrymandering is
a problem that cries out for judicial intervention. The sophisticated
means through which the dominant party can entrench itself in
power deny the accountability to voters upon which democracy
depends while relegating its opponent to semi-permanent minority
status.5 This is not a problem that will self-correct. So long as the
dominant party knows it can retain its legislative branch domi-
nance—and its control over the redistricting process in the next
cycle—it has no incentive to make a change. If one views judicial
1. See Adam Liptak, When Does Political Gerrymandering Cross a Constitutional Line?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/us/politics/when-does-
political-gerrymandering-cross-a-constitutional-line.html [https://perma.cc/KW8H-QL6T];
Daniel Tokaji, Symposium: A Path Through the Thicket—the First Amendment Right of
Association, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/
symposium-path-thicket-first-amendment-right-association/ [https://perma.cc/Y9D6-5D6H].
2. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 867-76 (2015).
3. See infra Part I.
4. 541 U.S. 267, 271, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
5. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
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review as a means by which to check incumbent self-entrenchment
and protect political minorities, thus making democracy work bet-
ter, then there is a strong case for judicial intervention.6 That is
particularly true in the era of hyperpolarization that we inhabit,
which makes it extremely unlikely that the major parties will
negotiate a political solution.
At the same time, there are good reasons to worry about the fea-
sibility of a legal standard for partisan gerrymandering claims,
particularly under the Equal Protection Clause. However noxious
the problem of partisan gerrymandering may be, it has a long pedi-
gree.7 The idea that partisan gerrymandering violates the Consti-
tution is therefore a hard sell for originalists.8 Nor is there an
established body of equal protection doctrine upon which those
challenging partisan gerrymandering can rely. There is certainly
some helpful language to be found in Supreme Court precedent,
most notably the Court’s statement in Reynolds v. Sims that the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees “fair and effective representa-
tion.”9 But equal protection jurisprudence is an imperfect fit for the
problem of partisan gerrymandering, given its usual requirement
that either facial or intentional discrimination be established.10 The
one-person, one-vote cases were an exception, allowing an equal
protection claim to be made without proof of discriminatory intent,
but this one-off was justified by the relatively bright line that the
Court developed through the equal population requirement.11
Partisan gerrymandering does not lend itself to a comparably sim-
ple solution. Any standard the Court creates will involve difficult
judgment calls. There are good reasons to worry about opening Pan-
dora’s box.
While most constitutional partisan gerrymandering litigation has
focused on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence suggested that
the First Amendment might provide a more promising basis for
6. See, e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 360-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., id. at 274-75 (plurality opinion).
8. See id. at 275-77.
9. 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964). 
10. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-44 (1993).
11. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
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challenges.12 Although his three paragraphs on the subject were
more suggestive than directive, the four cases he cited all involve
associational rights.13 Yet the scholarly commentary on the sub-
ject—most of it negative—has focused more on freedom of speech
than freedom of association.14 Two three-judge district courts—both
of whose decisions will be considered by the Court this term—have
looked more favorably on First Amendment association as a basis
for challenging partisan gerrymandering.15
This Article argues that the First Amendment expressive right of
association should be understood to prohibit excessive partisan
gerrymanders. The right of association has long been understood to
limit the dominant political group’s ability to discriminate against
its rivals.16 And the ballot is one of the primary loci at which voters,
candidates, and political parties associate.17 Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court has understood voting as First-Amendment-protected
association in certain contexts, including ballot access and prima-
ries.
Expressive association provides the strongest constitutional basis
for challenging partisan gerrymandering for three reasons. The first
is that it best captures the character of the injury, which inheres in
party-based discrimination—more specifically, the dominant polit-
ical party’s entrenchment of itself at the expense of the rival major
party and its supporters. Voting is not just an individual right but
also a collective activity.18 It is the means through which we join our
voices with like-minded others for the shared purpose of electing
our leaders. And political parties are the main entity through which
this aggregation occurs.19 It requires no great doctrinal innovation
12. See 541 U.S. at 314-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
13. See id. (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000); Eu v. S.F. Cty.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
14. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
15. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017); Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Md. 2016)
(three-judge court).
16. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 767 (2016).
17. See id. at 774, 776.
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983).
19. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy,
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 249 (identifying aggregation as a component of the right to vote). 
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to recognize this reality, nor to understand voting as associational
activity deserving of protection under the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has long understood elections as a locus for asso-
ciation among voters, candidates, and parties.20 It has therefore cast
a skeptical eye on laws that unduly burden elective association,
including restrictions on parties’ and candidates’ ballot access.21
Because existing First Amendment jurisprudence already accords
special attention to political parties as a group through which voters
associate, it provides a firmer legal basis for partisan gerrymander-
ing claims than the Equal Protection Clause does. While equal
protection has long been the go-to basis for challenging burdens on
voting, it is less well suited to address party-based discrimination.
There is, by contrast, a rich body of First Amendment law involving
discrimination based on party affiliation, on which courts might
draw in developing an association-based doctrine of partisan ger-
rymandering.22
The second reason for viewing partisan gerrymandering through
the lens of expressive association is that its legal test properly
focuses on effect rather than intent. The Supreme Court’s associa-
tional rights cases have long employed effect-based legal stan-
dards.23 Among the practices to which such standards have been
employed are ballot access, blanket primaries, and restrictions on
party endorsements.24 In the equal protection realm, by contrast,
the Court has usually required a showing of discriminatory in-
tent25—with the important exception of malapportionment cases,
although even in this context the legislature’s reasons for departing
from the one-person, one-vote rule are still relevant.26 There are
formidable reasons to prefer a legal standard that is based on effect
rather than intent in redistricting cases. When a legislature or other
multimember body adopts a plan, it always has multiple purposes,
including partisan advantage. The racial gerrymandering cases
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part II.A.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744-54 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016). 
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demonstrate the practical difficulties of discerning the “predomi-
nant” intent of line-drawers.27 Unless the Court is prepared to
declare even the slightest partisan motivation impermissible—a
standard that could well render every existing district unconstitu-
tional—it will find itself in a similar conundrum on partisan ger-
rymandering. An effects-based test is therefore preferable, and the
First Amendment right of association provides the strongest doc-
trinal basis for embracing such a standard.
The third reason why expressive association provides a suitable
vehicle for partisan gerrymandering claims is that it provides an
appropriately nuanced standard. For very good reasons, the Court—
including Justice Kennedy—has been unwilling to lay down a rule
that would categorically prohibit any partisan considerations in
redistricting.28 Such a rule would render virtually every existing
plan unconstitutional. It is, moreover, unrealistic to believe that
partisan considerations can be wholly extirpated from the process.
Attempting to do so would simply drive those considerations under-
ground, encouraging even greater subterfuge than redistricting al-
ready inspires. There may also be good reasons for drawing districts
in a manner that disproportionately benefits one major party or the
other. An emphasis on compact districts might advantage Republi-
cans, for example, while an emphasis on preserving communities of
interest might benefit Democrats. Any viable redistricting standard
should account for the good reasons that a state might have for
drawing a plan that, in the aggregate, gives one party more seats
than another with a comparable share of the vote. This turns out to
be a major advantage of the balancing standard that the Court has
adopted in its voting-as-association cases. It allows fair consider-
ation of both the burdens that the challenged practice has on the
nondominant party and the state interests that might justify these
burdens.
Before proceeding further, I should clarify the boundaries of
my argument. My goal is to work within the framework of existing
case law to develop a legal argument for striking down excessively
partisan gerrymandering based on the First Amendment right of
27. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017).
28. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292-93 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 316 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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association. The focus here is on legal doctrine rather than political
theory or empirical research. Accordingly, it does not delve into the
theoretical arguments for and against judicial intervention in gerry-
mandering, which other scholars have explored at length.29 So too,
my focus is not on the empirical metrics that courts might use to
determine whether a redistricting plan is unconstitutional.30 There
is a lively debate over how best to measure partisan fairness, in-
cluding symmetry.31 This Article may inform this debate, but it does
not offer any particular metric as the exclusive means by which to
assess constitutionality. Rather, its aim is to define the legal stan-
dard courts should apply in assessing whether a redistricting plan
29. There is an abundance of academic commentary on the subject. For some leading
examples, see generally Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an Empty
Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(2008); Adam Cox, Commentary, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 751 (2004); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law,
and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerryman-
dering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan
Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1985); and Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987).
30. For some exemplary attempts to measure partisan gerrymandering, see generally
Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and
Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013); Wendy K. Tam Cho & Yan Y. Liu,
Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying Extreme
Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351 (2016); Cox, supra note 29; Bernard Grofman &
Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering
After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007); Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Demo-
cratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1251 (1987); Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics
and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312 (2015); Eric McGhee,
Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55
(2014); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2; Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical
Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263 (2016); and Gregory S.
Warrington, Quantifying Gerrymandering Using the Vote Distribution (May 15, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09393.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9PC-TPRY].
31. See generally Cox, supra note 29 (claiming that asymmetry identifies unfair partisan
advantage); Grofman & King, supra note 30 (arguing for a metric of partisan symmetry); King
& Browning, supra note 30 (arguing that asymmetry indicates partisan bias); McDonald &
Best, supra note 30 (arguing for an equal vote weight standard that uses symmetry to diag-
nose entrenchment); McGhee, supra note 30 (arguing for a metric of efficiency rather than
symmetry or responsiveness); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2 (arguing for the effi-
ciency gap as a measure of partisan symmetry); Wang, supra note 30 (arguing for a partisan
bias standard that relies on partisan symmetry); Warrington, supra note 30 (critiquing
various metrics and arguing for a measure of declination to measure asymmetry).
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violates the right of association. The focus is not on the high-level
question of constitutional theory or the ground-level question of em-
pirical measurement, but rather on the mid-level question of legal
doctrine.
The remainder of this Article develops an argument to challenge
partisan gerrymanders as a violation of the First Amendment right
of association, focusing on the party-based character of the harm
and an administrable effects-based legal standard. Part I provides
background on the problem of partisan gerrymandering, explaining
why it has proven so intractable, especially when viewed exclusively
as an equal protection issue. Part II analyzes existing First Amend-
ment doctrine, showing that the Supreme Court has already recog-
nized voting as a form of association. Part III argues that this body
of doctrine should be applied to the problem of partisan gerryman-
dering, explaining how the legal standard developed in other voting
contexts might be adopted. It then traces how this standard might
be applied to past, pending, and potential legal challenges.
I. THE QUEST FOR A STANDARD
There are good reasons why it has been so difficult to come up
with a manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering. The roots
of the problem may be traced to Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme
Court’s seminal one-person, one-vote decision.32 Reynolds imposed
an equal population requirement for state legislative districts, ef-
fectively requiring decennial redistricting in every state.33 Part of
the genius of the Court’s opinion was to define the “one-person, one-
vote” requirement in individualized terms, asserting that malap-
portioned districts have the effect of denying equal representation
to everyone within them. The Court explained: “Since the achieving
of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the
basic aim of legislative apportionment, we conclude that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participa-
tion by all voters in the election of state legislators.”34 The sugges-
tion that “fair and effective representation” is a component of equal
32. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
33. See id. at 568.
34. Id. at 565-66.
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protection invited comparisons between malapportionment and the
gerrymandered plans that were subsequently imposed.35 If quan-
titative vote dilution (in the form of malapportioned districts) un-
constitutionally denies “fair and effective representation,” then why
does qualitative vote dilution (in the form of districts that system-
atically weaken an identifiable political group) not do the same?
The difference is that while malapportioned legislative districts
lent themselves to a straightforward legal standard—one person,
one vote—a comparable standard for partisan gerrymandering was
impracticable. The equipopulation standard was one that the Court
could effectively set and then forget. Though subsequent cases have
refined Reynolds’s one-person, one-vote requirement,36 its basic
contours were clear from the beginning. Partisan gerrymandering
presents a more complicated problem that is less susceptible to a
simple legal standard. The Court could prohibit any partisan con-
siderations from entering the redistricting process, but almost no
one takes this position seriously because it would render almost
every redistricting plan invalid.
The Court’s first attempt to grapple with this problem came in the
first redistricting cycle following Reynolds. In Gaffney v. Cummings,
the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a Connecticut state
legislative redistricting plan that allegedly attempted to replicate
the two parties’ support in the statewide electorate.37 The Court rea-
soned that legislators need not blind themselves to the political
consequences of the districts they draw.38 It also stated that the
justification for judicial intervention is at its “lowest ebb” when the
state attempts to allocate political power in accordance with the
political strength of the parties.39 But this left open the question
whether a plan that systematically disadvantages one of the major
parties violates the Constitution.
The Court’s next encounter with the problem of partisan gerry-
mandering occurred the next decade. In Karcher v. Daggett, decided
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016); Evenwel
v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Gaffney v. Cum-
mings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
37. 412 U.S. at 735-36, 743.
38. See id. at 752-53.
39. Id. at 754.
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in 1983, the Court considered a challenge to New Jersey’s congres-
sional redistricting plan.40 The majority concluded that the plan
violated the one-person, one-vote rule, despite the districts’ minus-
cule deviation from absolute equality.41 It held that Article I, Section
2—which forms the constitutional basis for the one-person, one-vote
rule in the context of congressional redistricting—imposes a more
stringent equality requirement than the Equal Protection Clause
does.42 Justice John Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion, however,
suggested that the real problem was partisan gerrymandering.43
Rather than looking exclusively to deviations from population
equality, he argued that courts should consider: “[1] whether the
plan has a significant adverse impact on an identifiable political
group, [2] whether the plan has objective indicia of irregularity, and
then, [3] whether the State is able to produce convincing evidence
that the plan nevertheless serves neutral, legitimate interests of the
community as a whole.”44 This marked the first serious attempt by
a Supreme Court Justice to articulate a constitutional standard for
partisan gerrymanders.
The full Court addressed the question more directly three years
later in Davis v. Bandemer.45 Plaintiffs in Bandemer challenged an
Indiana state legislative redistricting plan that allegedly disadvan-
taged Democrats.46 Although a majority of the Justices agreed that
partisan gerrymandering presented a justiciable claim,47 there was
no majority opinion on the applicable standard. Justice Byron White
wrote for the majority on the question of justiciability, but only for
a four-Justice plurality on the merits.48 The plurality would have
required “both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group” for
the plaintiffs to succeed.49 On the intent prong, the plurality noted
40. 462 U.S. at 727.
41. See id. at 727, 738, 744.
42. Id. at 730.
43. See id. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 751.
45. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
46. See id. at 113.
47. See id. at 113, 118, 125.
48. See id. at 113, 118; id. at 113, 143 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion) (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67-68
(1980)).
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that it generally should not be difficult to show that legislators
intended the consequences of the plan.50 This decision effectively
placed all the weight on the effect prong. On effect, the plurality
thought it insufficient for plaintiffs to show that it was more
difficult for members of one party to elect their preferred represen-
tatives.51 Rather, they believed that the plan must “consistently
degrade” their influence to violate the Equal Protection Clause.52
The plurality concluded that Indiana Democrats had failed to meet
this high standard and thus rejected their claim.53
Two Justices in Bandemer—Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Jus-
tice Stevens—agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims were
justiciable, but dissented from the rejection of Indiana Democrats’
claim.54 Justice Powell suggested a multifactor test, drawn in part
from Justice Stevens’s Karcher concurrence, that focused on the
shape of districts, their adherence to political subdivisions, the pro-
cedures used in adopting the plan, and the legislature’s goals.55
Justices Powell and Stevens found that plaintiffs had shown suf-
ficient indicia of partisan gerrymandering to sustain their claims.56
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the three remaining Jus-
tices in Bandemer.57 They agreed with the plurality that plaintiffs’
claims should be rejected, but would have done so on the ground
that partisan gerrymandering presented a nonjusticiable political
question.58 The upshot was that there was a six-Justice majority for
the proposition that partisan gerrymandering claims were justicia-
ble, but no majority agreement on the appropriate legal standard.
The result of Bandemer was an abundance of futility. As one of
the leading casebooks put it, Bandemer offered “an invitation to lit-
igation without much prospect of redress.”59 Proving the consistent
50. Id. at 129.
51. See id. at 131.
52. Id. at 132.
53. Id. at 143.
54. Id. at 161-62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 173 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753-61 (1983) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring)).
56. See id. at 174, 185.
57. Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. Id.
59. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002).
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degradation of political power upon which the Bandemer plurality
insisted proved a virtually insurmountable hurdle.
Almost two decades later, the Court returned to the issue—but
again, without a majority opinion. Plaintiffs in Vieth v. Jubelirer
challenged a Republican-drawn congressional redistricting plan that
allegedly disadvantaged Democrats.60 This time, Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote for a four-Justice plurality that would have held par-
tisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable.61 The plurality did not
disagree with the view that extreme partisan gerrymanders are
“incompatib[le] ... with democratic principles,” or even that they
might be unconstitutional.62 It instead concluded that it was not for
the courts to say because there were no judicially discoverable and
manageable standards to govern partisan gerrymandering claims.63
On the other side of the Court, four Justices thought that parti-
san gerrymandering claims were justiciable. Justice Stevens, Jus-
tice David Souter (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg), and
Justice Stephen Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions offering an
equal protection standard by which partisan gerrymandering might
be judged. Justice Stevens suggested a district-by-district approach
drawn from the Court’s racial gerrymandering cases, under which
the predominance of partisanship would render a district consti-
tutionally suspect.64 Justice Souter also proposed a district-based
approach, one that would consider multiple factors including the
intentional manipulation of lines to pack or crack the nondominant
party, drawing mostly from the Court’s equal protection cases.65
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, would have looked to the plan as
a whole, considering whether it amounted to “the unjustified use of
political factors to entrench a minority in power.”66 Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion saw the three different legal standards offered by
the dissenters as evidence that there was no judicially discernable
60. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 281.
62. Id. at 292. 
63. Id. at 281. 
64. Id. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 343, 347-51 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 355, 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and manageable standard, and thus that partisan gerrymandering
claims were nonjusticiable political questions.67
In the middle of the Vieth Court was Justice Kennedy, who agreed
with dissenters that the claim was justiciable but would have re-
jected it on the merits, without offering a clear standard for how
those claims should be evaluated.68 While saying that there were
“weighty arguments” for finding partisan gerrymandering claims
nonjusticiable, Justice Kennedy left the door open for them, saying
that “a standard might emerge” in some future case.69 Justice Ken-
nedy also suggested that the First Amendment might provide a
more satisfactory textual basis for partisan gerrymandering claims
than the Equal Protection Clause.70 Although he did not offer much
detail on the contours of such a claim, he identified a “First Amend-
ment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of
their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their
association with a political party, or their expression of political
views.”71 I address this portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion at
greater length in Part III.A. For now, what is most significant is
that all the First Amendment cases involve the right of expressive
association.
The stalemate continued in the next partisan gerrymandering
case, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC ) v. Perry,
which arose from Texas Republicans’ mid-decade congressional
redistricting plan.72 This time, the Court was even more splintered.
Justice Kennedy wrote the lead opinion.73 In a brief section for
which he had a majority, Justice Kennedy declined to revisit the
majority views in Bandemer and Vieth that partisan gerryman-
dering claims are justiciable.74 Writing only for himself, Justice Ken-
nedy then rejected the various standards that plaintiffs had
proposed.75 He also considered the symmetry standard proposed by
67. Id. at 292 (plurality opinion). 
68. See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 309, 312.
70. Id. at 314-15.
71. Id. at 314 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
72. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
73. Id. at 408-09 (Kennedy, J.).
74. Id. at 413-14 (majority opinion). 
75. Id. at 416-19 (Kennedy, J.). 
2172 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2159
amici political scientists, which compared how each of the parties
would have hypothetically fared with a given percentage of the
vote.76 While Justice Kennedy stated that he would not “altogether
discount[ ] its utility in redistricting planning and litigation,” he
thought that “asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of uncon-
stitutional partisanship.”77 Absent any other test, Justice Kennedy
felt compelled to reject plaintiffs’ claims.78 The two newest members
of the Court at that time, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice
Samuel Alito, agreed with Justice Kennedy that the plaintiffs’
claims should be rejected due to their failure to identify a reliable
standard, but did not opine on whether partisan gerrymandering
claims were unconstitutional.79
The remaining Justices more or less adhered to the positions they
had staked in Vieth. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
all maintained that partisan gerrymandering claims under the
Equal Protection Clause were justiciable,80 while Justices Scalia
and Thomas disagreed.81 The main difference was that Justices
Stevens and Breyer this time agreed on a standard, viewing the
legislature’s sole purpose in drawing the new map to be the max-
imization of partisan advantage.82 Justice Breyer joined Justice
Stevens’s partial dissent, which argued that “to rely exclusively on
partisan preferences in drawing district lines” violates both the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment.83 Yet they
offered little elaboration of their First Amendment theory beyond
the idea that it reflects the “duty of the sovereign to govern impar-
tially.”84
76. Id. at 419-20. 
77. Id. at 420. 
78. See id. at 423 (pluralilty opinion).
79. See id. at 492-93 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). 
80. See id. at 447 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 483
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
81. Id. at 511-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
82. See id. at 447, 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 491
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
83. Id. at 461 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 462. 
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These precedents have left lower courts in a quandary. There can
be no doubt that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable
under existing Supreme Court precedent. To the extent there was
any doubt on that question after Vieth, LULAC dispelled it. Yet it
is equally clear that there is no agreement on the legal standard
that should govern partisan gerrymandering claims or even on the
textual basis for such claims. The result has been for lower courts
to do their best to piece together a legal standard from the frag-
ments the Supreme Court has offered, as exemplified in recent cases
arising from Maryland and Wisconsin, both of which rest in part on
a First Amendment theory.85
While the courthouse doors remain open to partisan gerryman-
dering claims, there can be doubt as to the message that state leg-
islators have received from the Supreme Court’s inability to agree
on a legal standard. The redistricting cycle that followed Vieth and
LULAC witnessed some of the most extreme partisan gerrymanders
ever.86 Republicans were particularly adept in drawing favorable
maps in the many states—thanks to their success in the 2010 elec-
tion—where they held the pen.87 These maps were the consequences
of a concerted effort led by the Republican State Legislative Com-
mittee’s Redistricting Majority Project (REDMAP) to draw plans
that would systematically advantage Republicans, increasing their
total number of seats while giving them enough safe seats to
preserve legislative majorities even in an exceptionally strong
85. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017); Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D. Md. 2016)
(three-judge court). These cases are discussed in Part III.
86. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 836, 867-76; see also LAURA ROYDEN
& MICHAEL LI, EXTREME MAPS 1-2 (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
publications/Extreme%20Maps%205.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6TG-R9MY]; Wang, supra note
30, at 1282, 1294-99; Jeffrey S. Buzas & Gregory S. Warrington, Gerrymandering and the Net
Number of US House Seats Won Due to Vote-Distribution Asymmetries (July 20, 2017) (un-
published manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.08681.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q3Y-KE45].
But see Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerry-
mandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S.
House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329, 338 (2016) (estimating that partisan gerrymandering re-
sulted in only one net U.S. House seat for Republicans).
87. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 872; Wang, supra note 30, at 1291-92;
see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2135 (2018).
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Democratic year.88 The Court’s inability to agree upon a standard
has effectively green-lighted red and blue maps.
A striking example is the gerrymandering of Ohio after the last
census. Although a consummate purple state in presidential elec-
tions, Ohio’s congressional and state legislative redistricting plans
overwhelmingly favor the Republican Party.89 To ensure secrecy, the
maps were drawn in a hotel room close to the Ohio Statehouse,
which Republican operatives referred to as “[t]he Bunker.”90 The
state legislature ultimately adopted a congressional plan in which
eleven of Ohio’s sixteen districts had safe Republican majorities,
plus one district with a slightly smaller Republican majority.91 Dem-
ocrats were concentrated into the remaining four districts.92 This
cracking and packing of Democrats has achieved its intended pur-
pose marvelously. REDMAP boasted that the redrawn congressional
map gave Republicans twelve of sixteen seats in 2012, “despite vot-
ers casting only 52 percent of their vote for Republican congres-
sional candidates.”93 Republicans maintained all of these seats
through the first three elections of the current decade.94 In 2016, in
the closest congressional contest—for Ohio’s First District—the
88. For a detailed description of these efforts, see generally DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED:
THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY (2016). See also
Tim Dickinson, How Republicans Rig the Game, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics /news /how-republicans-rig-the-game-20131111 [https://perma.cc/
N4AJ-NYWM].
89. Under Ohio’s Constitution, the state legislature draws congressional plans and a
seven-person commission draws state legislative plans. OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1. Republicans
controlled both chambers of the state legislature and held the Governor’s office in 2011, and
therefore controlled the congressional redistricting process. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE VOTE: 2011 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN COMPOSITION (2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/2010_Legis_and_State_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AAN9-YK2H]. They also held all three of the statewide offices—Governor, Secretary of State,
and Auditor—with seats on the apportionment board, therefore giving them control of state-
legislative redistricting as well. See JIM SLAGLE, OHIO CAMPAIGN FOR ACCOUNTABLE
REDISTRICTING, OHIO REDISTRICTING TRANSPARENCY REPORT: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 5
(2011), http://www.lwvohio.org/assets/attachments/file/The%20Elephant%20in%20the%20
Room%20-%20Transparency%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT82-PXMH].
90. DALEY, supra note 88, at 88-89.
91. See id. at 90. 
92. See id. 
93. Id. at 86-87. 
94. See Party Control of Ohio State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Party_control_of_Ohio_state_government [https://perma.cc/H832-4ENM].
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winner prevailed by a margin of over 18 percent.95 Ohio’s partisan-
reapportionment board, which was also controlled by Republicans,
drew plans that assured Republicans a supermajority in both cham-
bers of the state legislature.96 In fact, Republicans were able to win
sixty of the state’s ninety-nine state house seats in 2012, even
though the Republican candidates received fewer overall votes.97
The state senate map even more strongly favored Republicans, giv-
ing them twenty-three of thirty-three seats,98 a margin they have
since expanded to twenty-four of thirty-three (72.7 percent).99
Neither the congressional nor the state legislative maps can plaus-
ibly be explained by an adherence to neutral criteria such as com-
pactness and the preservation of political subdivisions.100 Nor was
the partisan bias of the plans accidental. Documents obtained by a
nonpartisan watchdog group after the process had concluded demon-
strated that the mapmakers created an index that would maximize
Republican advantage, not only by giving them a supermajority of
seats but also by creating a sufficient cushion so that Republicans
would maintain a majority even in strong Democratic years.101
The Court’s redistricting cases also reveal the challenge in trying
to ground partisan gerrymandering claims in the Equal Protection
Clause. The prototypical equal protection claim relies on proof of
discriminatory intent. The racial gerrymandering cases have adap-
ted this requirement to redistricting, applying strict scrutiny if
plaintiffs can show that race is the predominant factor in drawing
district lines.102 In slightly different ways, the Vieth and LULAC
dissenters all tried to adapt an intent-based requirement to the
problem of partisan gerrymandering.103 There are reasons to doubt
95. See 2016 Official Election Results, OHIO SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.state.oh.us/
elections/election-results-and-data/2016-official-elections-results/ [https://perma.cc/82ED-
5BW8] (showing that Steve Chabot (R) received 59.19 percent of the vote, while Michelle
Young (D) received 40.77 percent). 
96. Cf. SLAGLE, supra note 89, at 2, 5; Ohio, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistrict-
ing.lls.edu/states-OH.php [https://perma.cc/Q2B8-3EVR].
97. See DALEY, supra note 88, at 86.
98. Id. 
99. Ohio State Senate Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_State_
Senate_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/94XR-MLWE].
100. See SLAGLE, supra note 89, at 9-12. 
101. See id. at 18-19. 
102. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017).
103. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
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the viability of this approach, even aside from its failure to garner
five votes.
The Court’s racial gerrymandering cases demonstrate the diffi-
culty of coming up with a manageable standard grounded in dis-
criminatory intent. It is hard enough to ascertain the intent of a
single person, all the more difficult with a multimember body such
as a legislature. These concerns are at their apex in redistricting,
where there are always multiple motivations—including but not
limited to race and partisanship—that underlie the lines drawn.
The Court’s persistent disagreement over the legal standard in
racial gerrymandering cases, almost a quarter century after its
seminal decision in Shaw v. Reno, should provoke hesitation in ex-
porting a comparable standard to partisan gerrymandering.104 If
anything, an intent-based standard is even more problematic in the
context of partisan gerrymandering. That is not only because par-
tisan considerations almost invariably play a role in districting, but
also because the partisanship can only fairly be evaluated in the
context of the plan as a whole—not merely by looking at a particular
district, as the racial gerrymandering standard does.105 After all, the
whole point of partisan gerrymandering is to advantage the dom-
inant party by maximizing its share of seats and ensuring that this
advantage will endure even in a strong year for the nondominant
major party. All of this suggests that we should be skeptical of us-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, at least as traditionally applied, as
the primary source of partisan gerrymandering claims. As Justice
Kennedy has suggested, First Amendment precedent suggests a
more promising route.106
dissenting in part); id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 491
(Breyer, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
104. See 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a discussion of the problems with the Shaw racial ger-
rymandering standard, see generally Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be a Liberal
to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998). 
105. See, e.g., Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015).
106. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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II. AN ALTERNATIVE PATH
The Supreme Court has never accepted the idea that voting is a
form of speech deserving of protection under the First Amendment.
But it has recognized voting as a form of protected association, at
least in certain contexts.107 From its earliest cases involving the
right of association, the Court has demonstrated special concern for
the interests of nondominant political factions, including political
parties.108 There are good reasons for this concern, arising from the
idea that the First Amendment is essential to self-government.109 A
core component of this vision is that the dominant political group
may not misuse its power to diminish the voice of those with
competing political views.110 Although the Court has not understood
voting as a protected form of speech, it has understood certain re-
strictions on voting as violative of the First Amendment right of
association.111 The idea is that the ballot is one of the central loci for
voters, candidates, and parties to associate politically.112 This line
of reasoning can and should be understood to apply to redistricting
plans that entrench the dominant party in power. This Part traces
the roots of First Amendment cases linking voting and associa-
tion, explaining how they furnish a doctrinal basis for judicial in-
tervention in partisan gerrymandering.
A. The Right of Expressive Association
For all the scholarly commentary on the subject of partisan ger-
rymandering, the relevance of expressive association has mostly
been overlooked. A handful of articles address the link between
107. Tokaji, supra note 16, at 771-84. 
108. See id. at 766-69.
109. This idea is most closely associated with the work of Alexander Meiklejohn. See
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263; see
also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 25-28 (1960); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1407 (1986).
110. See Tokaji, supra note 16, at 782-86.
111. See id. at 771-84.
112. See id. at 774, 776, 789.
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voting and free speech outside the context of redistricting.113 Guy
Charles analyzed the relationship between association and redis-
tricting in an article published before Vieth and LULAC, though he
focused on racial equality rather than partisan gerrymandering.114
Writing after these cases, David Schultz articulated the most elab-
orate scholarly defense of the idea that the First Amendment reach-
es partisan gerrymandering. His analysis relies primarily on liberal
political theory and the patronage cases, rather than on the body of
cases recognizing voting as a protected form of political associa-
tion.115 Other prominent scholars, however, have criticized the idea
that the First Amendment might limit partisan gerrymanders.116
What most of this scholarship misses is the fact that the Supreme
Court has long recognized voting as a protected form of association,
at least in certain contexts. To understand these cases, it is neces-
sary to go back to the origins of the right of expressive association,
113. Leading examples include Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for
Bush v. Gore?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643 (2005) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine
should have been applied in Bush v. Gore to invalidate “voter intent” instruction for recount-
ing ballots by hand); Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Dis-
enfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013) (arguing that viewpoint
discrimination doctrine should be used to evaluate restrictive voter participation laws); and
Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter
Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288 (2014) (advancing a “First Amendment Equal
Protection” theory to address the equality concerns in the electoral sphere). I briefly addressed
the relevance of free speech to redistricting in a previous article. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First
Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2409, 2515-19 (2003).
114. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amend-
ment Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209 (2003).
115. See David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First
Amendment, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2007). In a similar vein, Terry Smith argued that First
Amendment retaliation cases provide a basis for challenging partisan gerrymanders. Terry
Smith, Bond v. Floyd and Expressive Proscriptions on the Partisan Gerrymander, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. FORWARD 122, 124-25. For another sympathetic commentary on the relationship
between free speech and gerrymandering, see JoAnn D. Kamuf, Note, “Should I Stay or
Should I Go?”: The Current State of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal
for the Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 166-67 (2005). 
116. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 29, at 45-46; Richard Briffault, Defining the
Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 407-
09 (2005); Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 636-37 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff
& Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 541, 563-64 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Fore-
word: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 58-59 (2004).
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focusing particularly on its protection for political parties.117 The
Constitution, of course, does not expressly mention political par-
ties.118 The Framers took steps to curb what James Madison fa-
mously referred to as “the mischiefs of faction,”119 a category in
which they would likely have placed political parties.120 Yet political
parties quickly developed in the United States. As Justice Stanley
Reed observed, this was out of necessity, given the need to organize
the scattered and rapidly growing population of the new nation.121
So, too, the right of association is not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, though the “right of political association” was recog-
nized and celebrated as early as the time of Alexis de Tocqueville.122
The Supreme Court first affirmed the right of association in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.123 That case involved a state court
order requiring the NAACP to disclose its membership lists, a
mandate that would have subjected those listed to grave harms and
stymied its ability to attract any new members.124 Justice John
Harlan’s opinion for the Court cited the harm to the group and its
members’ ability to join together for expressive purposes.125 Noting
that the ability to speak effectively is enhanced by group associa-
tion, the Court wrote: “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an insep-
arable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”126
In other words, the right of association is a necessary corollary of
free speech. A few years later, in NAACP v. Button, the Court held
that the NAACP had a right to solicit prospective clients, recogniz-
ing its party-like status in public discourse.127 Though it was “not a
117. These cases are addressed in greater detail in Tokaji, supra note 16, at 766-71. 
118. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW 546 (6th ed. 2017).
119. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
120. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 53-54 (1969).
121. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1952). 
122. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180-85 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds., 2000).
123. See 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
124. Id. at 451, 462-63.
125. Id. at 462-63.
126. Id. at 460. 
127. See 371 U.S. 415, 431, 434, 444 (1963). 
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conventional political party,” its advocacy activities sought to ad-
vance the common interests of southern Blacks and thus warranted
protection.128
Other early association cases extended protection not only to civil
rights groups, but also to the Communist Party and other “subver-
sive” groups.129 In Noto v. United States, for example, the Court re-
versed the conviction of a party member where the specific intent to
further unlawful activities had not been proven.130 The original
association cases were thus focused on the rights of dissident polit-
ical parties and other groups, engaging in expressive activities that
the powers-that-be looked at with disfavor. The idea was that demo-
cratic discourse would be impoverished if their voices were dimin-
ished. From the beginning, then, First Amendment association was
rooted in the systemic importance to democratic debate, not just the
individual’s interest in associating with like-minded others. The
core concern is that the dominant faction would abuse its power to
suppress collective expression of ideas that might weaken its grip on
power. Largely on this rationale, the freedom of association was
later extended to other areas such as compelled association,131 cam-
paign finance regulation,132 and patronage.133
The right of expressive association is closely linked to the First
Amendment’s prohibition on content and viewpoint discrimination.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in Police Department of the
City of Chicago v. Mosley, it “means that government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”134 Or as Justice Scalia aptly put it in one of
his last dissents, “[T]he First Amendment is a kind of Equal
128. Id. at 431.
129. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1967);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
130. 367 U.S. 290, 298-300 (1961). Later cases extended this protection to public employ-
ment, see, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-62 (1967); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at
609-10; Elfbrandt, 384 U.S. at 19, and bar membership, see, e.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30-
31 (1971) (plurality opinion); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
131. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656-59 (2000); Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-35 (1977).
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
133. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
134. 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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Protection Clause for ideas.”135 This applies with special force when
political speech is concerned. The concern is that government
officials will misuse their authority to suppress the views of those
who might challenge their authority. Most important, it prevents
the dominant political group from trying to diminish the collective
voice of their opponents. In accordance with this ideal, the first
generation of expressive association cases restrict the government’s
ability to discourage or punish people for joining disfavored groups
like the NAACP or Communist Party.136
These decisions are partly about the infringement on the indi-
vidual liberty interest in determining what groups one does and
does not wish to associate with. But they also implicate the fun-
ctioning of the political system—most notably, the harm that would
flow from allowing the dominant faction to suppress nondominant
groups. An example is Elrod v. Burns, the seminal patronage deci-
sion in which the Court invalidated party membership requirements
for certain government jobs.137 After describing the harm to the lib-
erty of individual employees arising from such requirements, the
plurality wrote:
It is not only belief and association which are restricted where
political patronage is the practice. The free functioning of the
electoral process also suffers. Conditioning public employment
on partisan support prevents support of competing political in-
terests. Existing employees are deterred from such support, as
well as the multitude seeking jobs. As government employment,
state or federal, becomes more pervasive, the greater the de-
pendence on it becomes, and therefore the greater becomes the
power to starve political opposition by commanding partisan
support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the elec-
toral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the
135. Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1680 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For
other expressions of this idea, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 26-29 (1975); Ringhand, supra note 113, at 293-94;
Schultz, supra note 115, at 51; and Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 201-02 (1983). 
136. See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
137. 427 U.S. at 359-60, 373 (plurality opinion).
2182 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2159
practice’s scope is substantial relative to the size of the elector-
ate, the impact on the process can be significant.138
Elrod thus clarified that the right of association implicates the
proper functioning of the democratic process as well as individual
liberty.139 A central concern was that patronage would allow the in-
cumbent party to entrench itself while decimating its opposition.140
Elrod also exemplified the important status of political parties in
association jurisprudence.141 Because parties are the main entity
through which individuals and candidates join for electoral pur-
poses, practices that inhibit fair competition among the parties are
especially noxious. In this respect, associational rights under the
First Amendment are quite different from equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, where parties have generally
played a peripheral role.142
In one sense, Elrod’s concern with entrenchment is directly rel-
evant to partisan gerrymandering. Both patronage and gerryman-
dering are means by which the dominant party can preserve its grip
on power, thwarting the accountability upon which democracy de-
pends. Yet there is no denying that the mechanism by which that
self-entrenchment occurs is much different. Firing someone because
of her political affiliations works a concrete and individualized
harm, in a way that gerrymandering—however severe—does not.
Moreover, the patronage cases do not directly involve voting. It is
one thing to say that the First Amendment protects the right to
political association, including affiliation with nondominant politi-
cal parties. But it would require another step—some might even
claim a leap—to say that the First Amendment protects association
among voters, candidates, and parties in the electoral process.
138. Id. at 356. For a discussion of this passage, see Schultz, supra note 115, at 45-46.
139. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 372.
142. An important exception is the White Primary line of cases, in which the Court struck
down laws that effectively excluded African Americans from electoral politics by keeping them
out of the Democratic Party, which was the only game in town in southern states such as
Texas at the time. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462, 469-70 (1953); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73, 81, 89 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927).
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B. Voting as Association
As it turns out, however, the Supreme Court took this step almost
a half century ago, just a few years after its articulation of the one-
person, one-vote rule. In Williams v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to Ohio’s restrictions on new political parties’
access to the ballot.143 The State required new parties to file petition
signatures equal to 15 percent of the ballots cast in the preceding
gubernatorial election, a requirement that was challenged by
George Wallace’s American Independent Party and the Socialist
Labor Party.144 In an opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the Supreme
Court invalidated Ohio’s ballot-access rule, relying on both the First
Amendment right of association and the Equal Protection Clause.145
It reasoned that the State’s restriction “g[a]ve the two old, estab-
lished parties a decided advantage ... plac[ing] substantially un-
equal burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associate.”146
The Court thus stressed the risk of dominant parties using voting
rules to entrench themselves in power, giving them a “complete
monopoly” on power while harming nondominant parties and their
supporters.147 It thus imposed an impermissible burden on voting
and associational rights.148 Williams went beyond prior cases in es-
tablishing the ballot as a locus for association between voters, can-
didates, and parties. Moreover, it relied on the practical effect that
the State’s restrictions had on minor political parties and their sup-
porters.
In cases following Williams, the Court would consider a number
of other ballot-access requirements, upholding some149 while strik-
ing down others.150 It also extended the right of association to other
143. 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968). 
144. Id. at 24-26.
145. Id. at 31, 34.
146. Id. at 31.
147. See id. at 32.
148. See id. at 34.
149. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 726, 736 (1974) (upholding a requirement that
candidates disaffiliate from political parties one year before running as independent candi-
dates); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432, 441-42 (1971) (upholding a requirement that
minor-party and independent candidates obtain signatures from at least 5 percent of reg-
istered voters to obtain access to the ballot). 
150. See, e.g., Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979)
(invalidating a requirement that new parties and independent candidates obtain at least
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aspects of voting. An example is Kusper v. Pontikes, challenging an
Illinois law that kept voters from voting in a party primary if they
had cast a ballot in another party’s primary within the previous
twenty-three months.151 In striking down this voting restriction, the
Court relied on the right of association, reasoning that the law im-
paired the plaintiff ’s “ability to associate effectively with the party
of her choice.”152 Though the law did not completely bar voters from
associating with their preferred parties, it imposed a “substantial
restraint” on the voter’s participation in the political party’s “basic
function” of choosing a candidate, and was therefore invalid.153
Other cases from this era extended the right of association to voters
banding together to support ballot measures or candidates of their
choice.154
The next major development in the link between the right of as-
sociation and the right to vote was the Court’s decision in Anderson
v. Celebrezze, in which the Court articulated a constitutional stan-
dard for evaluating restrictions on access to the ballot.155 Anderson
arose from independent candidate John Anderson’s attempt to ob-
tain access to Ohio’s ballot in the 1980 presidential election.156 The
State required independent candidates to file papers in late March,
long before the major parties’ primary processes had concluded.157
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court struck down Ohio’s
requirement.158 The Court’s opinion relied on the “overlapping” First
Amendment right of association and the right to vote under the
Equal Protection Clause.159 It is therefore a sort of hybrid right.160
Recognizing that states must of necessity impose some limits on
twenty-five thousand signatures to get on the ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 711, 718
(1974) (striking down a $701.60 filing fee). 
151. 414 U.S. 51, 52, 61 (1973). 
152. Id. at 58. 
153. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
154. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 294, 296 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (per curiam). 
155. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
156. Id. at 782.
157. See id. at 782-83, 783 n.1.
158. See id. at 782, 806.
159. Id. at 786-87, 786 n.7 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)).
160. See Tokaji, supra note 16, at 776. But see Charles, supra note 114, at 1212-13 (under-
standing the Court to be relying on the Equal Protection Clause instead of the First Amend-
ment). 
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access to the ballot, the Court proceeded to articulate a balancing
test for assessing such claims.161 Under this standard, courts should
first consider the “character and magnitude of the asserted injury”
to associational and voting rights.162 It should then “identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the [s]tate,” including
the extent to which the state’s “interests make it necessary to bur-
den the plaintiff ’s rights.”163 It should then “weigh[ ]” the injuries
imposed against the state’s interests.164 The Court emphasized that
there is no “litmus-paper test” to separate permissible and imper-
missible restrictions, nor any way of avoiding the “hard judgments”
that courts must make.165
Anderson noted that “the state’s important regulatory inter-
ests” could generally “justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restric-
tions.”166 Though it did not provide much explicit guidance on the
meaning of these terms, some clues may be found in the application
of this standard to the facts before it. The Court struck down Ohio’s
ballot-access restriction on the ground that the State’s very early
filing deadline for independent candidates imposed too onerous a
burden on independent candidates and the voters who support
them.167 It noted that such “[a]n early ... deadline may have a sub-
stantial impact on independent-minded voters.”168 An independent
candidate may serve as a rallying point for “disaffected” voters who
are dissatisfied with the choices offered by both major parties.169
Because Ohio’s filing deadline passed long before the parties’ pri-
mary processes were complete, it would substantially impede dis-
affected voters from associating in this way. To deny them access
would conflict with the fundamental First Amendment value in
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate.170
Three points from the Court’s analysis are especially salient.
First, there was an identifiable class of voters who were impeded
161. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-90.
162. Id. at 789. 
163. Id. 
164. Id.
165. Id. at 789-90 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
166. Id. at 788. 
167. Id. at 790.
168. Id. 
169. See id. at 792 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968)). 
170. See id. at 794 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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from associating with one another—Justice Stevens described them
as the “disaffected.”171 Second, this class of voters was not completely
barred from associating with another. Rather, the ability of dis-
affected voters to associate was impeded by Ohio’s early filing
deadline, which made it more difficult for them to rally around an
independent candidate emerging in response to the two major par-
ties’ presidential nominees.172 Third, the Court focused on the bur-
den that the law imposed on disaffected voters and their preferred
candidate.173 In light of this burden, the Court concluded that Ohio’s
law “discriminates against those candidates and—of particular
importance—against those voters whose political preferences lie
outside the existing political parties.”174 Critically, the Court did not
require plaintiffs to prove that the state law was enacted or applied
with the intent to discriminate against them on this ground. This
sheds light on the Court’s prior remark that “reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions” may generally be justified by the state’s
“important regulatory interests.”175 Neither intent nor a tradition-
ally suspect classification was required to find that the law was
“discriminatory.” Rather, it was sufficient that the law substantially
burdened an identifiable group of voters’ ability to associate with
one another.176
Three years later, the Court extended Anderson’s standard to
major parties and their supporters. In Tashjian v. Republican Party
of Connecticut, the Court struck down Connecticut’s prohibition on
independent voters participating in party primaries, as applied to
the State’s Republican Party that had adopted a rule allowing
independents to participate in its primary.177 Democrats controlled
the state legislature which, “substantially along party lines,” had
rejected the Republican Party’s attempt to modify state law to allow
independents to vote in its primary.178 This time, the Court relied
exclusively on the First Amendment right of association, not on the
171. See id. at 792 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 33).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 793-94. 
174. Id. at 794. 
175. See id. at 788.
176. See id. at 806.
177. 479 U.S. 208, 210, 225 (1986).
178. See id. at 212-13. 
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Equal Protection Clause.179 Applying Anderson’s balancing test,
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court noted that the state rule
limited participation in the party’s “basic function” of selecting a
candidate, even though the party had “invite[d]” them to parti-
cipate.180 The State thus “limit[ed] the Party’s associational oppor-
tunities at the critical juncture at which the appeal to common
principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to
political power in the community.”181 Applying strict scrutiny, the
Court struck down Connecticut’s restriction, finding the State’s
claimed interests in avoiding administrative burdens, party raiding,
and voter confusion and in preserving the two-party system inad-
equate.182
Two aspects of Tashjian’s analysis bear emphasis. First, it was
critical that the Republican Party had invited independents to par-
ticipate in its primary, but were prevented from doing so by the
Democratic-controlled legislature.183 Second, the Court’s ultimate
concern was that this restriction on association would unfairly lim-
it the nondominant party’s “political power.”184 In this sense,
Tashjian’s analysis of the associational interest is similar to that
which appeared in Elrod. In both cases, the central concern was that
the dominant party would misuse its authority to limit its chief
rival’s power and thereby entrench itself.185 Subsequent decisions
follow Tashjian in assessing claimed violations of major parties’
associational rights, sometimes finding that those rights were vio-
lated186 and sometimes finding no violation.187 The key point is that
the Court continued to apply the balancing test articulated in
179. See id. at 213-17. 
180. Id. at 215-16 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973)).
181. Id. at 216. 
182. Id. at 217-25. 
183. See id. at 219-25.
184. Id. at 216.
185. See id.; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
186. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000); Eu v. S.F. Cty.
Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233 (1989). For criticism of these cases, see Daniel
Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1993).
187. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 459
(2008); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 597 (2005).
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Anderson to major parties’ claims that their associational rights had
been violated.188
Since then, the Court has continued to apply the Anderson bal-
ancing standard to alleged burdens on the associational rights of
both major and minor political parties. The most important refine-
ment of Anderson’s standard occurred in Burdick v. Takushi, which
upheld Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting.189 Burdick reaffirmed An-
derson’s “f lexible standard,”190 while clarifying that strict scrutiny
applies only if the challenged law imposes a “severe” burden on as-
sociation or voting.191 Burdick contrasted “severe” burdens with
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” but otherwise offered
little guidance on how courts should judge the severity of the bur-
den, beyond characterizing Hawaii’s law as “politically neutral.”192
Its explicit affirmation of Anderson, however, suggests that severi-
ty should be judged in the manner that the Court suggested in that
case—namely, by assessing the “character and magnitude” of the
burden and specifically whether it disproportionately affects an
identifiable political group.193 This refined version is often referred
to as the Anderson-Burdick standard.194
In the years since Burdick, the Court has continued to apply its
refined balancing standard to a wide variety of electoral rules, in-
cluding those governing ballot access and primary elections. The
most significant doctrinal development is the extension of Anderson-
Burdick to lawsuits challenging voter identification and other al-
leged barriers to participation, including those based solely on equal
protection.
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a divided Supreme
Court rejected a facial challenge to an Indiana statute requiring
most voters to present photo identification.195 Though there was no
188. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 451-52. 
189. 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992). 
190. See id. at 434. 
191. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
192. Id. at 434, 438 (first quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 289; and then quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1973)).
193. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
194. See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 636. For other cases in the Anderson
line applying its balancing test to uphold ballot-access restrictions challenged by minor
parties, see Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); and Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 199 (1986). 
195. 553 U.S. 181, 203-04 (2008) (Stevens, J.).
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majority opinion, all of the Justices applied some version of the
Anderson-Burdick balancing standard.196 Justice Stevens wrote the
lead opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy,
which held that the law “impose[d] only a limited burden” on voters
that was outweighed by the State’s interests in fraud prevention,
voter confidence, and election modernization.197 Tellingly, the Ste-
vens group noted that there was some evidence of partisan moti-
vation—Indiana’s law was enacted on a party-line vote, supported
by Republicans and opposed by Democrats—but held that this was
insufficient to invalidate it on its face: “[I]f a nondiscriminatory
law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications
should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may
have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legis-
lators.”198 This framing indicates that the presence or absence of
partisan motivation is not dispositive in assessing whether a law is
discriminatory. Instead, consistent with prior iterations of Ander-
son’s balancing test, the critical question is the law’s effect. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred.199 The Sca-
lia group would have rejected the facial challenge on more cate-
gorical grounds, avoiding an inquiry into the impact on individual
voters.200 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions.201 While the dissenters
agreed with the Stevens group that a balancing test should be
applied, they believed that the law imposed a disparate burden on
the less affluent that was not justified by the State’s asserted
interests.202
Since Crawford, lower courts have applied the Anderson-Burdick
standard in constitutional challenges to a wide variety of voting
laws, including those governing other identification laws, early
voting, and provisional voting.203 Most of these cases have been
196. See id. at 189-91; id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 209
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 193, 197, 203 (Stevens, J.) (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439
(1992)).
198. Id. at 204.
199. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
200. Id. at 204-05. 
201. See id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 211, 223-24 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237-41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
203. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2014); Ne. Ohio Coal. for the
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brought solely under the Equal Protection Clause, not the First
Amendment—a significant exception being the challenge to Texas’s
voter identification law.204 Some of the challenged laws have been
invalidated, others upheld, yet the standard has proven manageable
in all of these cases.205 The standard focuses courts on the right
questions, requiring that they weigh the laws’ burdens—particu-
larly their burdens on different groups of voters—against the state’s
asserted interests.206
Four key points about the right to association can be drawn from
the preceding discussion. The first is that, from its origins, the
emphasis of associational rights has been on the dominant group’s
self-entrenchment at the expense of disfavored groups, including
nondominant political parties. Second, the right of association is
grounded not only in individual liberty, but also in concerns about
the systemic impact on nondominant political groups. Third, the
right of association has been understood to include voters’, candi-
dates’, and parties’ association through the ballot. Fourth, in cases
involving voting as association, the Court has adopted a balancing
test that focuses on the effects rather than the intent. It has applied
this standard in cases involving both the right to association under
the First Amendment and the right to vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
What the Court has not yet done is to apply this established
balancing standard to redistricting. In Part III, I explain why it
should.
III. THROUGH THE THICKET
The Court’s established line of voting-as-association precedent
provides a firm constitutional basis for challenging excessive parti-
san gerrymanders. The First Amendment right of association best
captures the nature of the injury in partisan gerrymandering
Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 592-93 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Obama for Am. v.
Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2012).
204. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 684-85 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated
in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d in part, aff’d in part,
vacated in part en banc, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017). 
205. See Tokaji, supra note 16, at 783 & nn.128-29.
206. See id. at 782-90 (describing lower court cases and recommending that the Anderson-
Burdick standard be refined to focus on the partisan impact of the challenged laws). 
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claims, which arises from the dominant party’s entrenching itself in
power at the expense of the other major party and its supporters.
Although the Court has not yet applied the associational-rights
frame to partisan gerrymandering, the Anderson-Burdick standard
can be extended and refined to deal with this problem. In this Part,
I argue that partisan gerrymandering should be viewed as a vio-
lation of associational rights, explain how the voting-as-association
standard should be adapted and applied to these claims, and answer
objections to the association-based argument against partisan ger-
rymandering.
A. Gerrymandering as an Associational Injury
To understand why the right of association should be understood
to prohibit excessive partisan gerrymanders, it is helpful to return
to Justice Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence.207 The voting-as-association
cases discussed in Part II.B help us understand the insight at the
heart of this suggestion that partisan gerrymandering be examined
through the lens of the First Amendment.
Recall that Justice Kennedy remarked on the parties’ failure to
identify equal protection principles that would both justify and
confine judicial intervention.208 At the same time, he recognized that
there were compelling arguments for entering the political thicket,
as the Court had previously done with respect to the problem of
malapportionment.209 Quoting Carolene Products footnote four, he
observed that the right to vote is among the “political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”210 The suggestion
is that “minorities” should be understood to include nondominant
political parties and their adherents, who are systematically ex-
cluded from power by excessively partisan redistricting plans.211
Given this concern, Justice Kennedy—unlike the plurality—was
unwilling to give up the search for a “workable standard.”212 But he
207. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
208. See id. at 307-08.
209. Id. at 309-10. 
210. Id. at 312 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)). 
211. See id.
212. Id. at 311. 
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suggested that the parties in Vieth might be looking in the wrong
place by relying primarily on the Equal Protection Clause.213 His full
discussion of the First Amendment question, including the authori-
ties he cited, deserves extended quotation:
Though in the briefs and at argument the appellants relied on
the Equal Protection Clause as the source of their substantive
right and as the basis for relief, I note that the complaint in this
case also alleged a violation of First Amendment rights. The
First Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provi-
sion in future cases that allege unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mandering. After all, these allegations involve the First Amend-
ment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of
their participation in the electoral process, their voting history,
their association with a political party, or their expression of po-
litical views. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality
opinion). Under general First Amendment principles those bur-
dens in other contexts are unconstitutional absent a compelling
government interest. See id., at 362. “Representative democracy
in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the
ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the elec-
torate candidates who espouse their political views.” California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000). As these
precedents show, First Amendment concerns arise where a State
enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a
group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason
of their views. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that
means that First Amendment concerns arise where an appor-
tionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of
voters’ representational rights.
The plurality suggests there is no place for the First Amend-
ment in this area. The implication is that under the First
Amendment any and all consideration of political interests in
an apportionment would be invalid. That misrepresents the
First Amendment analysis. The inquiry is not whether political
classifications were used. The inquiry instead is whether polit-
ical classifications were used to burden a group’s representa-
tional rights. If a court were to find that a State did impose
burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their
views, there would likely be a First Amendment violation, unless
213. See id. at 314.
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the State shows some compelling interest. Of course, all this de-
pends first on courts’ having available a manageable standard
by which to measure the effect of the apportionment and so to
conclude that the State did impose a burden or restriction on the
rights of a party’s voters.
Where it is alleged that a gerrymander had the purpose and
effect of imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters,
the First Amendment may offer a sounder and more prudential
basis for intervention than does the Equal Protection Clause....
The First Amendment analysis concentrates on whether the
legislation burdens the representational rights of the complain-
ing party’s voters for reasons of ideology, beliefs, or political
association. The analysis allows a pragmatic or functional as-
sessment that accords some latitude to the States. See Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214
(1989); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).214
The voting-as-association line of cases brings Justice Kennedy’s
insight into clearer focus. At its core is the idea that the First
Amendment does more than protect individual liberty; it also en-
sures a fair political process. More specifically, it guards against
the dominant faction entrenching itself in power.
The citation to Elrod captures this concern. Recall that the plu-
rality in that case grounded its reasoning not just on individual
liberty, but also on the systemic concern with the incumbent party
entrenching itself by “starv[ing] political opposition.”215 To be sure,
patronage accomplishes this objective through a different mecha-
nism than gerrymandering. But Justice Kennedy was right to see a
common concern with the dominant faction burdening a rival fac-
tion and its adherents, diminishing their ability to compete through
the electoral process.216 At the heart of this concern is the pluralist
focus on groups as integral to the proper functioning of democratic
self-government.217 As political scientist Robert A. Horn wrote, even
214. Id. at 314-16 (partial citations omitted).
215. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (plurality opnion).
216. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
217. For enlightening discussions of pluralism, see ROBERT A. HORN, GROUPS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 10-13 (1956); and Richard J. Ellis, Pluralism, in LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note
118, at 16, 16-20. For a recent argument in favor of a pluralist approach to electoral reform,
see BRUCE E. CAIN, DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 25
(2015) (“[P]luralism[ ] openly acknowledges the need for intermediary agents such as political
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before freedom of association became a staple of our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence: “Freedom of association is important to real-
ization of the good society; it is essential to maintenance of modern
democratic government.”218 The sustenance of self-government thus
depends on judicial intervention to protect those groups that are
disfavored by the governing majority. In our era of highly competi-
tive and hyperpolarized politics, the dominant party’s incentive to
entrench itself in power has never been stronger.219 Nor have the
stakes ever been higher.
Justice Kennedy was also right to identify “association with a
political party” as a central concern under the First Amendment,
though not the Equal Protection Clause.220 That idea is also implicit
in his citations to California Democratic Party and Eu.221 While
these cases seem far afield from the subject of gerrymandering,222
they both involved claims that major political parties’ associational
rights were violated.223 These and the other voting-as-association
cases discussed in Part II.B put political parties at the center of
their analysis, and properly so. For electoral politics is organized
around political parties, more so than any other kind of group. That
has been true throughout the history of the United States, as in
other democratic countries.224 That is not to deny that parties are
parties, interest groups, and lobbyists.”). 
218. HORN, supra note 217, at 11; see also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 710 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is a distinctive part of the American charac-
ter for individuals to join associations to enrich the public dialogue.” (citing HORN, supra note
217, at 13-18)).
219. For a sampling of the literature on partisan polarization, see generally ALAN I.
ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2010); PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC:
HOW INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY AFFECT POLITICS,
COMPROMISE AND EVERYDAY LIFE 18 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-
2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RD9-DT5T]; SOLUTIONS TO POL-
ITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY
POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); and Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The
Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 276-81 (2011).
220. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
221. See id. at 314-16 (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Eu v. S.F.
Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)).
222. See Hasen, supra note 116, at 636 (noting that California Democratic Party v. Jones
was about compelled association, not disfavored treatment based on political viewpoint). 
223. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 571 (2004); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Demo-
cratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989).
224. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 118, at 545. 
2018] GERRYMANDERING AND ASSOCIATION 2195
dynamic, multifarious, and amorphous entities.225 The key point is
that political parties have played a central role in the development
of the right of association, including voting-as-association cases,
because they are instrumental to the proper functioning of demo-
cratic government. They are also unique among associations, as Pro-
fessor Horn recognized, in that “[t]hey seek to gain and keep control
of the machinery of government and thus to direct the great invol-
untary association, the state.”226 This makes it especially critical
that courts guard against the dominant political party attempting
to entrench itself in power by squeezing out its rivals.
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of the First Amendment
properly focused on the “burdens” placed upon nondominant polit-
ical parties and their adherents—in particular, whether burdens
were placed “on groups or persons by reason of their views.”227 This
is consistent with the voting-as-association line of cases, including
Anderson, which he cited at the conclusion of his First Amendment
discussion that balanced the burdens against the State’s interest.228
Justice Kennedy also suggested that a flat prohibition on partisan
considerations in redistricting would be a nonstarter.229 Contrasting
racial gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering, he noted that
the latter “presents a more complicated question” because it de-
mands inquiry into “whether a generally permissible classification
has been used for an impermissible purpose.”230 The implication is
that some partisanship in redistricting is allowable—perhaps even
inevitable—but that too much of a burden on the nondominant ma-
jor party might cross a constitutional line.231 The Anderson-Burdick
standard is also consistent with Justice Kennedy’s desire for “a
pragmatic or functional assessment that accords some latitude to
225. Tokaji, supra note 16, at 785-86; see also V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRES-
SURE GROUPS 224-25 (4th ed. 1958) (identifying three components of political parties: the
party-in-government, party leadership, and party-in-the-electorate); Joseph Fishkin &
Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the
Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 187 (understanding parties “as a loose coalition of
diverse entities ... organized around a popular national brand”).
226. HORN, supra note 217, at 99. 
227. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
228. See id. at 315-16.
229. See id. at 313.
230. Id. at 315.
231. See id. at 316.
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the States.”232 It avoids striking down plans merely because parti-
sanship may have played some role in their formulation, while al-
lowing for consideration of the legitimate justifications—such as
promoting compactness, keeping together political subdivisions,
and protecting communities of interest—that might justify plans
that tend to favor one major party over the other.
As explained in Part II.B, the voting-as-association cases focused
on the effects of the challenged practice and did not require plain-
tiffs to prove an intent to discriminate. This might seem at odds
with Justice Kennedy’s statement that both “purpose and effect”
are relevant in assessing whether a partisan gerrymander violates
the First Amendment.233 It is one thing to say (as Justice Kennedy
did) that “First Amendment concerns” arise when a plan has the
purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters.234 But, as he
recognized, it is quite another to define the legal standard that will
govern such claims.235 And it is no great innovation to have an
effects-based standard designed to get at the problem of purposeful
discrimination. Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, for example, employ effects-based stan-
dards that are aimed to stop purposeful race discrimination.236 So
too, one can define partisan gerrymandering as the intentional
manipulation of district lines to entrench one party and subordinate
the other,237 while believing that an effects-based standard is best-
suited to address this harm. And that is exactly what the Anderson
line of voting-as-association cases does.
Still, it is reasonable to ask what association adds to the mix.
After all, the Crawford Court incorporated the Anderson-Burdick
standard into equal protection law—albeit without a majority opin-
ion—and lower courts now routinely apply that standard to various
232. Id. at 315.
233. See id. at 314.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 309.
236. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at § 10301(a) (Supp. III 2016)); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(2012).
237. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015) (defining partisan gerrymandering as “drawing of legislative district lines to sub-
ordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival party in power”). 
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burdens on voting.238 Given that development, it might be argued,
the Court could simply apply the Equal Protection Clause to parti-
san gerrymandering, without needing to rely on the First Amend-
ment right of association.
While the Court certainly could apply the Anderson-Burdick bal-
ancing standard under the Equal Protection Clause given Crawford,
there are good reasons for understanding partisan gerrymandering
as an associational injury. As explained in Part II.B, there is a
venerable First Amendment tradition of looking with disfavor on the
dominant political group’s efforts to entrench itself in power by
weakening its rival. This tradition, moreover, recognizes the special
role that political parties play in constitutional democracy—which
includes both their key role in organizing politics, as well as the
special dangers that exist by virtue of parties’ unique status as
entities that “seek to gain and keep control of the machinery of gov-
ernment.”239 This makes political parties both especially important
and especially dangerous, as the Court has long recognized in its
First Amendment association cases—including those which see the
ballot as a locus for association.240 There is, by contrast, no equal
protection tradition of looking with disfavor on laws that are
designed to entrench the dominant political party. The Court could
certainly create one out of whole cloth, but it would be preferable to
develop a standard from the existing voting-as-association line of
cases.
B. Applying the Voting-as-Association Standard
The Anderson-Burdick standard requires courts to balance the
burden on associational and voting rights against the state’s in-
terests.241 So stated, this is about as open-ended as legal standards
come. Greater precision is therefore required in order for this stan-
dard to apply to partisan gerrymandering in a way that courts will
find manageable. Accordingly, this Section explains how the es-
tablished voting-as-association standard might be adapted to the
problem of partisan gerrymandering. It also sketches out how it
238. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
239. See HORN, supra note 217, at 99. 
240. See supra Part II.A.
241. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (Stevens, J.).
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might be applied, explaining how the analysis might differ from that
which was applied by the courts in past and ongoing cases.
To recap, Anderson said courts should consider the “character and
magnitude of the asserted injury” to associational and voting rights,
then “identify and evaluate the precise interests” advanced by the
state, and weigh the burdens against the state’s interests.242 Bur-
dick clarified that only “severe” burdens—which it contrasted with
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory” ones—warranted strict scrutiny.243
Less-than-severe burdens may be justified by “the [s]tate’s impor-
tant regulatory interests.”244
The first question is what courts should consider in assessing the
“character and magnitude” of the burden arising from an alleged
partisan gerrymander. To answer this question, we may look both
to the Court’s associational rights cases and to its definition of par-
tisan gerrymander. Recall that in its associational rights cases, the
Court focused on the impact that the challenged practice has on
nondominant political factions. In the NAACP cases, for example,
the Court focused on how compelled disclosure and anti-barratry
laws would affect dissident political groups.245 In Williams, it con-
sidered how a petition signature requirement would affect new
political parties and their adherents.246 In Anderson, it scrutinized
the early filing deadline’s impact on “disaffected” voters.247 In
Tashjian, it looked to how the prohibition on independents voting in
party primaries affected the nondominant major party.248
While the Court has not yet applied this standard to redistricting,
it has recently offered a definition of partisan gerrymandering: “the
drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one
political party and entrench a rival party in power.”249 This defi-
nition helps clarify what courts should consider in assessing the
“character and magnitude” of the burden on association and voting.
242. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
243. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (first quoting Norman v. Reed, 502
U.S. 279, 289 (1992); and then quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). 
244. See id. (quoting Anderson, 480 U.S. at 788). 
245. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
246. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-26 (1968).
247. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792.
248. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1986).
249. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658
(2015). 
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The character of the burden should be enduring, not simply giving
the dominant party control for one election cycle, but lasting—or at
least expected to last—throughout the decade. In terms of magni-
tude, the advantage granted to the dominant party should be
substantial. Whatever the legislature’s purpose, a plan that only
slightly advantages the dominant party cannot qualify as a partisan
gerrymander. Only redistricting plans that give the dominant par-
ty a large and lasting advantage should be considered partisan
gerrymanders.
To say that a gerrymander must be large and lasting does not tell
us how these attributes should be measured. In this respect, par-
tisan gerrymandering claims are quite different from one-person,
one-vote claims, as to which the nature of the injury (malapportion-
ment) defines the metric (population).250 There are multiple ways by
which to measure the burden that a redistricting plan imposes on
the nondominant party. Perhaps the simplest is proportionality,
comparing the seats that a party wins to the votes its candidates
received. Another is symmetry, comparing how each of the major
parties would fare if their candidates received a given percentage of
the vote.251 And there are varying ways of assessing symmetry, in-
cluding the efficiency gap,252 seats-to-vote curve,253 and mean-medi-
an vote share difference.254 The goal of this Article is not to endorse
or reject any of these proposed metrics as the one that courts should
apply. An advantage of the flexible standard that the Court has
adopted in its voting-as-association cases is that it would allow
250. There is a caveat: as originally articulated, the one-person, one-vote rule did not
specify the denominator that should be used in determining whether districts were equally
populated—for example, total population, citizen population, registered voter population. Only
recently did the Court clarify that it is constitutional for states to use total population as the
denominator. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016). 
251. Some of the Justices in LULAC spoke favorably of symmetry as a way of measuring
partisanship. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 466 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 483 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While
Justice Kennedy thought that symmetry might be useful, he believed it was insufficient to
show the unconstitutionality of Texas’s congressional plan. See id. at 420 (Kennedy, J.); see
also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 833 & nn.8-10. 
252. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 2, at 834.
253. See Cho & Liu, supra note 30, at 360; Richard G. Niemi & Patrick Fett, The Swing
Ratio: An Explanation and an Assessment, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 75-76 (1986); Wang, supra
note 30, at 1306.
254. See ROYDEN & LI, supra note 86, at 4.
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consideration of multiple methods, including ones that have yet to
be developed.
In this respect, an association-based standard for partisan ger-
rymandering would bear a closer resemblance to the standard used
for assessing minority-vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act
than it would to the standard for assessing malapportionment under
the Equal Protection Clause.255 Just as the means by which racial
polarization is measured have evolved over time, along with ad-
vancement in empirical methods, so too the methods of measuring
partisan effects can be expected to evolve over time. A manageable
standard should allow courts to consider new methods of measuring
partisan gerrymandering as they develop, rather than locking them
into a particular metric that may prove outmoded in a few years.
To sketch out how this would work in practice, it may help to
consider how an adapted version of the voting-as-association stan-
dard compares to the analyses that three-judge district courts have
applied in pending cases arising from Maryland and Wisconsin,
both of which involve First Amendment claims. The first, Shapiro
v. McManus, was a challenge to Maryland’s Democrat-drawn
plan.256 Plaintiffs’ challenge focused on the Sixth Congressional Dis-
trict, which covered western and part of north-central Maryland and
was considerably altered after the 2010 census.257 This reshuffling
was allegedly designed to flip the District from Republican to Dem-
ocratic control, and it achieved its desired objective, allowing a
Democratic challenger to defeat the incumbent Republican.258 Plain-
tiffs alleged that the plan “crack[ed]” Republicans who formerly re-
sided in the district, with the purpose of diluting Republican votes,
in violation of the First Amendment.259 A single district judge
originally dismissed the case, which the Fourth Circuit summarily
affirmed,260 but which the Supreme Court reversed on the ground
255. For discussion of different means of measuring racial polarization, see Christopher S.
Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 607-25 (2016); and
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1355-56 (2016).
256. 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585-86 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge court).
257. Id. at 585-87.
258. Id. at 588. 
259. Id. at 589. 
260. Benisek v. Mack, 11 F. Supp. 3d 516 (D. Md. 2014), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 140, 141 (4th
Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015).
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that the First Amendment claim was not “wholly insubstantial” and
therefore remanded to a three-judge court below.261
On remand, the three-judge district court in Shapiro denied a
motion to dismiss the challenge to Maryland’s Sixth Congressional
District.262 The court’s analysis started out at the right place, recog-
nizing that political association lies at the core of the First Amend-
ment and that it protects “[t]he right of qualified voters, regardless
of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.”263 From
that point, however, the district court’s opinion went off the rails.
The court compared the injury arising from partisan gerrymander-
ing to retaliation for the exercise of one’s First Amendment rights,
emphasizing that these cases require a motivation to take adverse
action because of speech or other protected conduct.264 The funda-
mental problem with the Shapiro court’s analysis is that retaliation
is the wrong frame through which to understand partisan gerry-
mandering. Retaliation involves a tangible harm to a particular
individual, while partisan gerrymanders by their nature inflict a
systemic harm on a group of voters.265 Patronage cases like Elrod
are helpful as a matter of principle, insofar as they reveal that the
risk of the dominant faction entrenching itself lies at the core of the
right of association. But it is simply wrong to characterize the
group-based injury inflicted upon the nondominant party and its
members as retaliation.
The court proceeded to articulate a three-part test, requiring
plaintiffs to show (1) specific intent to impose a burden on plaintiffs
because of their votes or party affiliation, (2) a sufficient degree of
vote dilution, and (3) causation, in the sense that the injury would
not have occurred but for the mapmaker’s intent.266 This test pro-
vides a semblance of objectivity but in reality does nothing to focus
or narrow the inquiry. In virtually any case where one party con-
trols the redistricting process, it will be possible to show a “specific
intent” to burden voters affiliated with the nondominant party, in
261. Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455-56 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682-83 (1946)). 
262. Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 600.
263. Id. at 594 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983)). 
264. See id. at 595-96.
265. See Hasen, supra note 116, at 635.
266. Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 596-97.
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the sense of making it more difficult for them to elect their preferred
candidates. While the second prong of the Shapiro court’s test ges-
tures in the right direction—in the limited sense of understanding
the injury as a form of vote dilution—it provides virtually no guid-
ance on how much of a dilutive effect must be shown. Furthermore,
the effect of a plan can only be judged by assessing its entire impact,
not by examining a particular district as the plaintiffs’ challenge
invited the court to do.267 Shapiro’s “causation” prong is entirely
vacuous. It is hard to imagine any case in which both intent and a
sufficient effect will be shown, yet but-for causation cannot be
shown. As the Bandemer plurality recognized three decades ago, it
can generally be presumed that mapmakers intend the partisan
consequences of their actions.268 Finally, the Shapiro court’s test
leaves no room for the state to come forward with interests that
might provide a justification for the lines drawn.
In fairness to the court, the problems with its analysis were of the
plaintiffs’ making. Instead of challenging the plan as a whole,
showing that it systematically discriminated against the Republi-
can Party and its adherents, plaintiffs chose to challenge a single
congressional district.269 Moreover, plaintiffs chose to frame their
association claim in terms of retaliation,270 a square peg in a round
hole if there ever was one. Had plaintiffs mounted a systemic
challenge to the plan as a whole, relying on the voting-as-association
cases, it is conceivable that they might have been able to establish
that the plan imposed a substantial and enduring burden on Re-
publicans.271 But the district court was wrong to allow the plaintiffs’
claim to proceed on the theory that they presented.272
267. See id. at 599.
268. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“As long as redist-
ricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political
consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”).
269. See Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 585-86.
270. See id. at 585.
271. See ROYDEN & LI, supra note 86, at 7, 9-10, 13 (finding some evidence of a pro-
Democratic skew in Maryland’s congressional plan).
272. In subsequently denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the three-
judge district court persisted in its square-peg approach to gerrymandering. Benisek v.
Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 808-15 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court) (finding that plaintiffs
failed adequately to show a sufficient likelihood of success). The Supreme Court heard oral
argument on the case in the spring of 2018. See Benisek v. Lamone,138 S. Ct. 543 (2017)
(mem.), argued, No. 17-333 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018); Benisek v. Lamone, SCOTUSBLOG, http://
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The analysis applied in the Wisconsin case is much more per-
suasive. In Whitford v. Gill, a majority of the three-judge court held
that Wisconsin’s Republican-drawn state legislative redistricting
plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, in violation of
both the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.273 In
contrast to the Maryland case, plaintiffs in Whitford properly fo-
cused on the effect of the plan as a whole, rather than on a parti-
cular district.274 That makes sense, given that the gravamen of a
partisan gerrymandering claim is the systemic injury to the non-
dominant major party and its adherents, which can only be judged
by examining the entire plan. Plaintiffs presented copious evidence
that the plan was adopted with the intent to benefit Republicans
and that it had precisely the intended effect.275 Prominent among
the evidence of the plan’s discriminatory effect was evidence of its
large efficiency gap, showing that the plan resulted in many more
“wasted” Democratic than Republican votes.276
Based on this evidence, two of the three judges on the Whitford
district court found a constitutional violation.277 Writing for the ma-
jority, Judge Kenneth Ripple drew on both the right-to-vote cases
decided under the Fourteenth Amendment and the right-of-associa-
tion cases under the First Amendment.278 With respect to the latter,
the court properly grounded its analysis in the balancing test adopt-
ed in the Anderson line of cases.279 In justifying this approach, the
majority explained that associational rights provided an especially
valuable frame in light of the evidence that Wisconsin’s redistricting
process was entirely controlled by the majority caucus, in this case
the Republicans.280 In these circumstances, voters aligned with the
nondominant party were denied a fair opportunity to form a legis-
lative majority, effectively diminishing the weight of their votes in
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/benisek-v-lamone/ [https://perma.cc/4WV5-XHK3].
273. 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No. 16-1161
(U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
274. See id. at 843.
275. Id. at 846-53, 857-62. 
276. Id. at 854-55, 859-61. 
277. See id. at 926.
278. See id. at 864-83. 
279. See id. at 880-83. 
280. See id. at 882. 
2204 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:2159
comparison with voters aligned with the dominant party.281 The ma-
jority proceeded to articulate its own three-prong test, which it said
should govern under both the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment, requiring: (1) an intent “to place a severe impediment”
on voters based on their political affiliation, (2) the effect of doing so,
and (3) the absence of an alternative, legitimate justification.282
While this three-part test has much to recommend it, there is one
glaring problem: the voting-as-association cases decided under the
First Amendment did not require plaintiffs to prove an intent to
discriminate.283 In support of this requirement, the Whitford major-
ity relied primarily on equal protection cases, although it also cited
language derived from Anderson and Burdick, contrasting severe
restrictions with “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” ones.284 This over-
looks the fact that the Anderson-Burdick standard does not require
plaintiffs to prove defendants’ discriminatory intent to establish a
violation.285 An intent to discriminate against the nondominant par-
ty may well be a “factor” in the analysis, as the Whitford majority
noted, particularly in establishing that the state’s asserted interests
are pretextual.286 The Anderson-Burdick standard, however, does
not require proof of discriminatory intent to establish that the chal-
lenged law imposes a severe burden on associational rights.287 There
is a strong argument for demanding proof of intent under the Equal
Protection Clause—especially because the Bandemer plurality
required it288—but the court should have bifurcated that analysis
from its First Amendment association analysis, rather than requir-
ing intent to prevail on both claims.289 An intent-based inquiry is
281. Id. at 882-83.
282. Id. at 884.
283. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983).
284. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997)). 
285. See supra Part II.B.
286. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
287. In support of the proposition that the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove
discriminatory intent, the Whitford majority also cited Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. While Iqbal imposed such a requirement in the circum-
stances presented there—a noncitizen’s claim that he was detained because of his political
views—intentional discrimination is not required in all First Amendment contexts, and
certainly not for voting-as-association claims. See supra Part II.B.
288. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129 (1986) (plurality opinion).
289. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
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particularly undesirable for partisan gerrymandering claims, given
the difficulty of discerning the intent of a multimember body, like
the state legislatures, as well as the reality that the intent to benefit
the dominant party will almost always be present when the legis-
lature draws the lines.
Aside from its misguided requirement that plaintiffs prove intent
on their First Amendment claim, the Whitford majority’s articula-
tion and application of the standard was compelling. The court
thoroughly addressed the evidence that Wisconsin’s plan systemati-
cally disadvantaged Democrats while securing a lasting legislative
majority for Republicans.290 In finding the requisite effect, the court
emphasized expert evidence regarding the plan’s asymmetry, in-
cluding the seats-vote curve and the efficiency gap.291 This showed
not only that the plan gave Republicans a much larger percentage
of seats than Democrats, but also that this advantage had persisted
through two elections and was expected to persist through the re-
mainder of the plan’s life.292 The court then turned to the State’s
asserted interests.293 While recognizing the State’s “political geogra-
phy” as a permissible consideration that “naturally favors” Republi-
cans to some degree, the majority concluded that it could not explain
the large and lasting advantage that the plan gave to the dominant
party.294
While there are some problems with the district court opinions
in both Shapiro and Whitford, the latter does a much better job of
articulating and applying the voting-as-association standard that
this Article advocates. Both courts rightly began with the recogni-
tion that voting laws disadvantaging the nondominant political
party may violate the right of association.295 Both courts, however,
290. See id. at 898-910. 
291. See id. at 903-05.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 910-27.
294. Id. The third judge on the Wisconsin district court, Judge William Griesbach,
dissented. Id. at 932 (Griesbach, J., dissenting). Judge Griesbach persuasively questioned the
viability of an intent-based analysis, noting that such an intent is almost always likely to exist
when the state legislature draws the map. See id. at 933. Yet his analysis suffers from its
failure to apply the standard adopted in the voting-as-association cases, under which the
burdens on the nondominant party and its adherents should be balanced against the state’s
asserted interests. Cf. id. at 932-65.
295. See id. at 880 (majority opinion); Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 594 (D.
Md. 2016) (three-judge court).
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wrongly grafted an intent requirement onto the voting-as-associa-
tion standard.296 The Shapiro court also made serious errors in its
inapt comparison of partisan gerrymandering to retaliation and its
focus on a single district instead of the plan as a whole.297 By con-
trast, the Whitford court’s analysis—particularly its consideration
of the plan’s effects and the State’s asserted interests298—is consis-
tent with the adapted version of the voting-as-association standard
that I recommend.
C. Answering Objections
There are several objections that one might make to the applica-
tion of the voting-as-association standard to partisan gerrymander-
ing claims. While some are more weighty than others, none of them
are ultimately persuasive.
One argument is that partisan gerrymandering does not actually
prevent voters from associating with one another, at least not in
the same manner as the other burdens on voting to which the Court
has previously applied the First Amendment.299 That is certainly
true in one sense. Gerrymandering does not stop people from voting
for their preferred candidate or party in the manner that a third-
party or independent candidate’s exclusion from the ballot would.
Nor does it inflict a tangible injury on an individual, as patronage
does.300 The problem with this objection is that it overlooks the
systemic harm to the disfavored political faction that underlies the
right of association. While the infringement of individual liberty is
surely part of the rationale for the right of association, its primary
and most persuasive justification is that it prevents the dominant
party from entrenching itself in power at the expense of those who
favor its chief rival.301 That justification applies with at least the
same force to partisan gerrymandering as to any of the other prac-
tices upon which the right of association has focused in prior cases.
296. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884; Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
297. See Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 595-96, 599-600.
298. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 911.
299. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 29, at 46.
300. Hasen, supra note 116, at 635.
301. See supra Part III.A.
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A second possible objection is that using the First Amendment to
challenge partisan gerrymandering would necessarily erect an ab-
solute prohibition on any legislative consideration of the partisan
impact of a plan, something that is both unrealistic and undesir-
able.302 I agree that such a standard would be imprudent—and,
partly for this reason, do not favor intent-based inquiries of the sort
in which the Shapiro and Whitford courts engaged. As the Whitford
dissent noted, partisan considerations cannot plausibly be removed
from redistricting unless the process is taken from the legislature
and entrusted to a politically independent commission.303 While
some might view this as preferable from a policy perspective, it is
hard to see how this is required as a matter of constitutional law.
Fortunately, the balancing standard adopted in the voting-as-asso-
ciation cases does not require the extirpation of all partisan con-
siderations from the redistricting process. It instead embraces a
more nuanced and calibrated approach, one that would invalidate
plans with the most extreme partisan effects while taking into con-
sideration the good reasons a state might have for adopting a plan
that may give one party some degree of advantage over the other.
A third objection is that the First Amendment does not offer an
adequate theory of representation as justification for judicial inter-
vention in partisan gerrymandering. Sam Issacharoff and Pam
Karlan are among those who have levelled this criticism at Justice
Kennedy’s discussion of the First Amendment in his Vieth concur-
rence.304 It is an understandable reaction, given that Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion does not connect the dots between the associational
rights cases he cited. Yet there is a theory of representative demo-
cracy embodied in these cases, one that Professor Issacharoff him-
self has endorsed in prior scholarship.305 The principle is that courts
should intervene to prevent electoral practices through which the
dominant political party entrenches itself while subordinating its
chief rival.306 Although this principle is not expressly stated as such,
302. See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 29, at 45-46; Briffault, supra note 116, at 408-
09. 
303. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 933 (Griesbach, J., dissenting).
304. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 116, at 563-64.
305. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 600; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 646.
306. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 646-47.
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a fair reading of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in light of the associa-
tional cases he cited suggests that there is in fact a theory of rep-
resentation, albeit one that can only be gleaned by reading between
the lines.307 One might further argue, as Dan Lowenstein has, that
the major parties do not require judicial protection of their associa-
tional rights because they are “grown-ups who ... can be expected to
take care of themselves.”308 This may be true in some contexts, but
the associational rights cases recognize that there are circumstances
in which courts should step in to protect the nondominant party’s
associational rights.309 As long as those cases remain law, there is
a strong doctrinal argument for judicial intervention in partisan
gerrymandering, which can entrench the dominant party as surely
as virtually any other imaginable practice.
Perhaps the most serious concern is one that has been made with
respect to every standard for partisan gerrymandering that has ev-
er been proposed: that it is not judicially manageable.310 It must be
conceded that the standard I recommend leaves considerable room
for judicial discretion. There are no bright lines to be found here.
This, in turn, opens the door to the claim that judges will reach be-
yond their proper sphere, intruding on functions that more properly
belong to political actors.
This manageability question is the most difficult one, because its
answer depends on how one understands the role that federal courts
should play in a democracy. There are first-order disagreements on
this question.311 For those who worry most about “legal imper-
ialis[m]”312—or, less rhetorically, judges overstepping their proper
bounds—this concern is sure to be dispositive. Yet there is a coun-
tervailing concern, one that the Court has often found dispositive in
other contexts: that the dominant political faction will use what
might otherwise be a fleeting majority to lock itself into power and
lock its main competitor out, preventing the minority from becoming
a majority and denying the people the accountability upon which
307. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-16 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
308. See Lowenstein, supra note 186, at 1790. 
309. See supra Part II.A.
310. For leading examples of this line of argument, see Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
29, at 3-5; and Schuck, supra note 29, at 1330.
311. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 217, at 130. 
312. Id.
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representative democracy depends.313 Thirty years ago, it was
plausible to characterize partisan gerrymandering as “a self-limiting
enterprise.”314 Not anymore. The increasingly sophisticated tech-
nology that mapmakers have at their disposal allows them to draw
maps that at once give them a disproportionate number of seats and
ensure a durable majority, even in years when the opposing major
party runs especially strong.315 The case for judicial intervention has
thus become stronger over the decades in which the Court has
struggled with the question of partisan gerrymandering. The bal-
ancing test applied in the voting-as-association cases provides the
best available standard.
CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has long recognized in its voting-as-assoc-
iation cases, there is no litmus test that can magically separate per-
missible and impermissible burdens.316 Yet these cases articulate a
standard that has proven manageable in related contexts and can
be adapted to the problem of partisan gerrymandering.317 Conscien-
tious judges will surely disagree on how the Anderson-Burdick bal-
ancing test applies in this context, as they have done in cases
involving voter identification and other burdens on voting. To ac-
knowledge the reality of reasonable disagreement in a standard’s
application is not, however, to say that there is no judicially man-
ageable standard. If federal courts are to serve their proper role in
preventing the dominant political faction from subordinating its
competitors, a concern nearly as old as the Republic itself, then an
association-based challenge to excessive partisan gerrymanders
should be recognized.
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